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Summary
This paper seeks to extend the conceptual framework of interfirm power
relationships within marketing channels. Based, in large part, on a review
and synthesis of research on power in the marketing channels, social psychology,
organizational behavior, sociology, and political science literatures, a
general model of the interfirm power-influence process is developed which (1)
clarifies major aspects of dimensions of interfirm power and (2) identifies
constructs with a primary linkage to power within interfirm channel relation-
ships.

INTRODUCTION
A growing body of theoretical and empirical research has aided our
understanding of vertical power relationships within marketing channels
in recent years. The early theoretical perspective on interfirm power
(i.e., one firm's potential influence on the behavior and/or decision
making of another firm) in terms of its primary sources, uses, and con-
sequences is exhibited in Stern (1969) and Heskett, Stern, and Beier
(1971). Bucklin (1973), Robicheaux and El-Ansary (1975), and Stern
and Reve (1980) present models and/or theoretical frameworks contri-
buting to the area's conceptual development. El-Ansary and Stern
(1972) were the first to empirically analyze the distribution of power
among firms in a marketing channel. Major empirical studies on inter-
firm power by Wilkinson (1973), Hunt and Nevin (1974), Lusch (1976,
1977), and Etgar (1976, 1978b) followed. Reve and Stern (1979) present
a review of this research while offering additional insights into the
theoretical basis for studying interfirm behavioral interactions in a
distribution channel.
The previous modelling efforts by Bucklin (1973), Robicheaux and
El-Ansary (1975), and Stern and Reve (1980) center more on the general
nature of behavioral interactions among business firms than con-
centrating in depth on interfirm power. Absent from the marketing
channels literature is a comprehensive conceptual model which centers
specifically on interfirm power and its primary aspects or dimensions
(e.g. , the origin of power) and correlates (e.g. , interfirm influence
strategies) based on an integration of relevant research. The develop-
ment of such a conceptualization would appear to have at least three
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benefits. First of all, a comprehensive conceptual model on interfirm
power may serve to heighten the interest academic researchers have in
studying interfirm power relationships by (1) synthesizing what is
currently known in the area, (2) identifying and defining constructs
with a primary linkage to interfirm power, and (3) suggesting issues
for future research. This is critical considering the importance of
understanding business firm interactions within marketing channels and
the relative scarcity of empirical research in the interfirm power
area at the present time.
Second, the development of a conceptual model which centers on
interfirm power considerations (i.e., its primary dimensions and
correlates) may broaden the scope of future empirical research in the
area. Sheth (1976) contends that without a comprehensive conceptual
perspective in an area, empirical research tends to localize on a few
basic issues or orientations without considering many relevant,
unexplored aspects on important topics of interest. What empirical
research has been performed on interfirm power in marketing channels
has centered primarily around the "bases of power"' concept developed
by French and Raven (1959). Aside from this limited focus, there is
evidence that the bases of power concept is incomplete. As indicated
by Wilkinson and Kipnis (1978), a number of studies in social psycho-
logy suggest that many relevant influence tactics do not readily fit
into this classification.
A final benefit of a more complete conceptual model on interfirm
power would be to shed light on the dynamics of power's usage in
dyadic channel relationships. Etgar (1978a) suggests that power may be
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used most frequently to halt an ongoing conflict situation. Lusch
(1978), on the other hand, contends that while power may be used at
times in this context, its use may more frequently be the actual
instigator of certain interfirm conflicts. A conceptual model which
elaborates on the varying influence strategies applicable in interfirm
settings and possible costs associated with their use may clarify,
to a degree, the issues raised by Etgar (1978a) and Lusch (1978).
Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to extend the concep-
tual framework, of interfirm power relationships in marketing channels.
The paper revolves around seven aspects or dimensions of interfirm
power: (1) the origin or source of power; (2) the level or amount of
power; (3) the means of exerting or applying power; (4) the weight or
strength of power; (5) the extension or domain of power; (6) the range
or scope of power; and (7) the costs of exerting or applying power.
These dimensions were identified based on a synthesis of Dahl (1957),
Harsanyi (1962a, 1962b), Nagel (1968), and Beier and Stern (1969).
While each of these dimensions appears to have applicability in a
channels context, they have received little attention in the marketing
channels literature.
A conceptual model of the interfirm power-influence process (i.e.,
the series of actions and reactions which result from the application
of interfirm power) is developed within the paper, built around the
first four dimensions previously mentioned. As will become evident,
to address these dimensions adequately, the identification and defini-
tion of other constructs (e.g., influence strategies, types of
influence) with a primary linkage to interfirm power is necessary.
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A discussion of the latter three dimensions (i.e., the extension of
power, the range of power, and the costs of applying power) is facili-
tated after the model's presentation.
The model is designed to help explain how one firm attempts to
gain influence or" effect on another firm's autonomous decision making
and/or behavior. As such, an inspection and description of the bar-
gaining behavior which takes place between two firms on their joint
decision making is beyond the scope of this paper.
As suggested previously, the paper is largely based on a synthesis
of the present marketing channels literature on interfirm power.
Research is also drawn from the social psychology, organizational
behavior, sociology, and political science literatures on power to
supplement contentions made within the paper and/or to suggest
possible additions to the conceptual framework of interfirm power
relationships. Additionally, in a number of cases, the ideas of cer-
tain researchers are extended within the paper. Based on research by
Gill and Stern (1969), Hunt and Nevin (1974), Robicheaux and El-Ansary
(1975), and Lusch (1976), the concept of role performance or a firm's
actual ability to carry out expected tasks based on its position in
the channel is developed. One firm' s perceived role performance in a
channel dyad is posited to drive the level of the other firm's depen-
dence in that relationship. A classification of previously identified
influence strategies is devised ranging from relatively implicit,
nonovert strategies to relatively explicit, pressurized strategies.
Extending ideas by Alderson (1965), Tedeschi, e_t. al. (1973), and
Lusch (1976), possible costs associated with the use of these varying
strategies are discussed. Three types of influence or effect on a
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f inn's perceptions, behavior, and/ or decision making are identified:
(1) implicit influence (i.e., source firm effect based on the target's
perception change); (2) explicit influence (i.e., source effect based
on pressurizing the target to do something); and (3) anticipatory
influence (i.e., source effect based on target favors). Research by
Simon (1953), Parsons (1963), Hunt and Nevin (1974) and Lusch (1976)
was instrumental in identifying these types of influence. Following
Stern, e_t. al. (1973), two dimensions of the "bases of power" rationale
developed by French and Raven (1959) are identified, one dealing with
resources which affect the goal attainment of the target firm making
it synonjonous with the basic foundations of dependence theory, the
other centering at the means a firm's boundary personnel can utilize
in applying their firm's power. Personal interviews with approximately
forty new car dealers of various makes in the automobile distribution
channel guided the development of these conceptual contributions.
INTERFIRM POWER AND INFLUENCE
Although power has been defined in a variety of ways in the social
psychology, sociology, organizational behavior, and political science
literatures (e.g.
,
power as force or pressure, power as influence or
control), power has been consistently defined in the channels context
as one firm's ability to influence the perceptions, behavior, and/or
decision making of members of another firm (i.e., potential influence)
(e.g., El-Ansary and Stern 1972, El-Ansary 1973, Wilkinson 1973, Hunt
and Nevin 1974). As indicated by Tedeschi, et. al. (1973), Wilkinson
(1973), and Etgar (1977), defining power as "potential influence" allows a
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clear distinction between it and influence or actual effect on another's
perceptions, behavior, and/or decision making. This is important con-
sidering that a certain degree of power may be unused or inappropriately
applied in a channel relationship (El-Ansary and Stern 1972). For
example, a target firm with high power in a channel dyad may apply very
little of it in a given period because his primary objectives center
elsewhere at this time (e.g., enhancing consumer demand). Additionally,
the costs of applying power may dictate that some power is unapplied in
certain situations (Harsanyi 1962a, Bonoma 1976, Stern 1977). As a
result, it appears that levels of power and influence will not be equi-
valent in dyadic channel relationships.
A MODEL OF THE INTERFIRM POWER- INFLUENCE PROCESS
Figure 1 presents a general model of the interfirm power-influence
process in a marketing channel which will be fully explained herein.
Six primary aspects or dimensions of this process are identified on
the left-hand column of Figure 1 each with a corresponding level in
the general model. As indicated previously, four of these dimensions
(i.e., the origin of power, the level of power, the means of applying
power, and the weight of power) have been suggested by Dahl (1957),
Harsanyi (1962a, 1962b), Nagel (1968), and Beier and Stern (1969) as
being important to consider when analyzing and evaluating power. The
"interaction" and "types of influence" dimensions fall naturally into
the process. While the model was developed in the context of a
franchise channel system, its general logic appears applicable to non-
contractual channel settings as well.
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[Place Figure 1 About Here]
Note that the model emphasizes the nature of two-way interaction
in a channel dyad. Each firm in a channel dyad may have a certain
level of power and may attempt to attain influence on the other's
behavior and/or decision making (Beier and Stern 1969, Etgar 1976).
Origin of Power
The first dimension of Figure 1 which will be discussed is the ori-
gin or source of power. This concerns how power is first attained and
subsequently maintained by a firm in a dyadic channel relationship.
As indicated in Figure 1, the origin of a firm's power or potential
influence in a channel dyad is posited to be driven by two factors:
(1) the firm's authority in the relationship; (2) the other firm's
dependence in the relationship. To more fully understand the
constructs of authority and dependence, Figure 2 is presented.
[Place Figure 2 About Here]
Authority
. A firm's authority in a dyadic channel relationship (V9
and VIO) is its prescribed right to affect certain behaviors which is
accepted by the other firm (Robicheaux and El-Ansary 1975). In large
part, authority is based on the target firm's voluntary compliance on
certain issues and/or decisions due to its beliefs in the source's right
to command and its duty to obey (Bannister 1969, Hickson et. al. 1971,
Bucklin 1973, Robicheaux and El-Ansary 1975). Beier and Stern (1969)
indicate that a firm's authority is congruent with the concept of legi-
timacy developed by French and Raven (1959).
As exhibited in Figure 2, the business agreement between two firms
(VI in Figure 2) may generate a degree of authority for each in their
relationship. The nature of the interfirm agreement can vary from long
term contracts which exist in franchise channel systems, short term
contracts specifying the terms of a yearly or one time sales transaction,
to mere verbal agreements (Rubin 1978). Whatever the nature of the
agreement, it will specify certain issues which each party must abide
by in their relationship. This will establish certain levels of
authority for each party on these issues.
Additionally, based on the vertical channel position of each firm
in the dyad (V2 and V3) , certain norms or rules of conduct may exist in
the channel which guarantees each member certain levels of authority in
the relationship aside from any formal agreements between the parties
(Gill and Stern 1969). For example, a retailer may follow the manufac-
turer's recommended price list on certain products merely because of
past precedent within their distribution channel.
Dependence . A firm's dependence on another firm (V8 and Vll)
represents its need to maintain the relationship in order to achieve
its goals. Dependencies arise among firms because of task specializa-
tion and functional differentiation within the marketing channel (Reve
and Stern 1979). "Because every channel member is responsible for some
phase of channel task accomplishment, each member is dependent to some
extent on the other members within the network" (Stern 1977). If a
firm's level of goal attainment is high and it appears that few if any
alternative relationships could provide the same level of goal
attainment, the firm would be predicted to have high dependence in the
relationship (Emerson 1962).
Within a dyadic channel relationship, the channel position of each
firm (V2 an V3) contributes, in large part, to the set of inherent
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in determining its role performance and thus a target firm's depen-
dence in their channel relationship.
The dependence of the target firm can also be affected by the
nature and outcomes of the source's influence attempts over time.
This feedback effect is illustrated in Figure 1 by the dotted line
from a source firm's overall level of influence to the target's
dependence. This issue will be considered in greater depth later
in the paper.
The Bases of Power . While French and Raven's (1959) concept of
legitimacy is congruent with a firm's authority and included at this
dimension, the other bases of power (i.e., the reward, coercive,
expert, and referent bases) are not explicitly included in the model.
However, it will soon become evident that they do have a place at this
dimension as well as at the "means of applying power" dimension.
Following the conceptualization and operationalization of this
rationale in Stern, et^. al. (1973), it appears that each base of power
has two aspects, one centering on verbal statements that the source
firm communicates to the target firm hoping to attain behavioral
compliance on certain issues, the other dealing with target firm's
evaluation of these communications and/or the general channel relation-
ship. Discussing the second aspect first, the target may evaluate the
resources (e.g., consumer demand, assistances) the source firm pro-
vides in the relationship to facilitate his goal attainment (Stern,
et . al. 1973). Based on these evaluations, the target firm must
decide whether compliance is required given the particular message
communicated. For example, a source firm's regional manager may ask
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tasks or responsibilities that each party must perform to facilitate
the other's goal attainment (Gill and Stern 1969). Responsibilities
may be related to channel positions over time through tradition (Stern
1977), cost tradeoffs (Rubin 1978), managerial preferences (Cort and
Stephenson 1978), or legal considerations (Hunt and Nevin 1974). They
may also be negotiated in certain business situations (Robicheaux and
El-Ansary 1975). Gill and Stern (1969) and Robicheaux and El-Ansary
(1975) refer to these inherent tasks as each firm's role set in their
relationship (V4 and V5).
The existence of the role set in channel relationships enables each
party in the dyad to anticipate the behavior of the other firm to a
degree (Gill and Stern 1969). Additionally, Hunt and Nevin (1974) and
Lusch (1976) indicate that a source firm's performance in providing
assistances (e.g., excellent training programs and operation manuals)
to the target firm will have a significant bearing on the nature of
their relationship. This suggests that a firm's performance on ele-
ments of its role set or its role performance (V6 and V7) (i.e., the
ability to carry out expected tasks based on its position in the
channel) will drive the level of the other firm's dependence in the
relationship as it affects or is perceived to affect levels of that
firm's goal attainment. For example, such elements as a source firm's
ability to generate demand (Beier and Stern 1969)
,
provide a high
level of customer service or dealer support (e.g., product allocation)
(Willet and Stephenson 1969), offer high quality assistances (e.g.,
operation manuals) and advice (Hunt and Nevin 1974, Lusch 1976), and
meet other firm's behavioral expectations in interactions (e.g., the
firm's cooperative nature) (Alderson 1955, Bucklin 1973) may be important
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terms of a firm's role performance. A target firm's desire to iden-
tify with a source firm (i.e., the referent base) may be driven by the
sources' relative status in its industry (Beier and Stern 1969).
Industry status may be driven by a firm's role performance on its mar-
keting strategy variables which generates a high level of market demand
and thus a relatively high market share. A firm's ability to provide
quality advice and assistances (i.e., the expert base) may be an impor-
tant element of its channel role (Hunt and Nevin 1974). By increasing
role performance on certain issues (e.g., product allocations, renumera-
tion on warranty claims), the source firm can enhance the "reward base"
which exists in the relationship for the target firm. Contrarily, by
decreasing role performance on certain issues, the "coercive base" comes
into prominence. Considering this congruence, the "bases of power"
rationale was not included as a separate philosophy at this dimension
(i.e., the origin of power).
The second aspect of each base of power concerns the actual
character or content of the communication presented by the source to
the target. With the reward, coercive, legitimate, and expert bases,
the nature of the communication appears straightforward. For example,
a boundary person may stress that rewards (e.g., wider profit margins,
better product allocations) will be granted if the target complies
with his firm's requests. With the referent base, the communications
may tend to be more covert (e.g. , a boundary person implies that their
friendship or the target's need to identify with the source firm
requires compliance) . This dimension of the bases of power becomes
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a target firm to increase its product inventories in a given period.
In return, he may promise the target firm increased cooperation on
product allocations and deliveries in the future (e.g., a reward cen-
tered approach). In such cases, the target may evaluate the source
firm's previous contributions to its goal attainment (e.g., previous
rewards) as well as the potential for additional contributions in the
future (e.g., the credibility of the source firm in providing promised
rewards). Similar examples could be made for the other "bases of power.
The main point of this discussion is that such evaluations all
relate to consideration surrounding the target's goal attainment,
whether past, present, or future. As such, this aspect of the "bases
of power" appears consumed in the dependence approach. Emerson (1962)
highlights this possibility when, in referring to the French and Raven
(1959) paper, he states, "Careful attention to our highly generalized
conception of dependence will show that it covers most if not all of
the forms of power listed in that study." Guiltinan (1977) recognizes
a degree of overlap exists between the bases of power rationale and
dependence theory. Like Emerson (1962), he suggests that dependence
theory is the more encompassing and general approach. This reasoning
is also supported, in part, by Heskett, £t. al. (1969) who indicate
that the strength of a source firm's various bases of power may be
positively related to the level of a target firm's dependence in their
dyadic channel relationship.
To further illustrate the close similarity between this aspect of
the bases of power rationale and dependence theory, consider that the
referent, expert, reward and coercive bases can be interpreted in
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important after a firm's decision to apply power has been made. There-
fore, it centers at power's use rather than at power's origin and has
apparent applicability at the "means of applying power" dimension.
This point will become clearer later in the paper.
Level of Power
The level or amount of a firm's power refers to how much poten-
tial influence it actually has in a relationship. As exhibited in
Figure 1, and inferred previously, the level of a firm's power is seen
driven by levels of its authority and the other firm's dependence in
their dyadic channel relationship. As Kotter (1976) indicates, an
entities formal authority does not necessarily guarantee levels of
influence; it is only a resource that can be called on at various
points in time in attempts to attain influence. Ridgway (1957), Beier
and Stern (1969), Wilemon (1973), and Bucklin (1973) have indicated
the close relationship between a firm's authority and its level of
power in a marketing channel.
Thibaut and Kelly (1959) and Emerson (1962) propose that a
source's power can be inferred based on the target's dependence in
their relationship. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) indicate, "The
target's dependence reflects how much the source firm must be taken
into account and, also, how likely it is that it will be perceived as
important and considered in the target's decision making." A number
of organizational behavior and marketing channel researchers have
recognized the applicability of this approach to explain the origin of
interfirm power in channels of distribution (e.g., Thompson 1967,
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Beier and Stern 1969, El-Ansary and Stern 1972, Etgar 1976, Benson
1975, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Reve and Stern 1979, Cadotte and
Stern 1979).
Note that a high level of target dependence does not preclude the
possibility that a high level of dependence also exists for the source
firm in their relationship. Thus, following WilTcinson (1973), the
applicability of the "zero sum game" concept to interfirm power settings
is questioned based on the nature of the relationships depicted and
explained in Figures 1 and 2.
Feedback effects may also directly impact a source firms level of
power as exhibited in Figure 1. This will be discussed later after a
description of the other components of the model.
Means of Applying Power
Boundary personnel (i.e., persons whose job centers at facilitating
transactions and exchanges of products, services, and/or information
with other firms) are responsible for utilizing their firm's power in
attempts to attain influence in dyadic channel relationships (Ridgway
1957)." The motivation behind a firm's attempts to seek influence on
another firm's behavior and/or decision making may result from (1)
interfirm coordination and marketing strategy execution considerations
(e.g., cooperation on sales promotion campaigns) (Alderson 1965), (2)
the presence of conflicting channel goals (Stern 1977), and/or (3) a
boundary person's desire to meet territorial performance objectives
(Ridgway 1957). Whatever the specific motivations, interfirm
influence strategies or the means a firm's personnel utilize in their
influence attempts deserve attention in this context.
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Tedeschi, et^. al. (1973) indicate that much of the social psychology
research on power has centered on influence strategies that people use
in attempting to manuever others rather than centering on either the
origin or ultimate effects of power (e.g., Horai and Tedeschi 1969,
Tedeschi, et. al. 1972, Lindskold and Tedeschi 1972). Use of in-
fluence strategies have also received some conceptual attention in the
sociology and organizational behavior literatures (e.g.. Parsons 1963,
Benson 1975). In the marketing channels literature, while Hunt and
Nevin (1974) and Lusch (1976) empirically analyze the use and effects
of certain coercive strategies in a channel setting (e.g., threats of
termination) , little has been done to conceptualize the nature of
varying interfirm influence strategies.
A review of the aforementioned research areas as well as personal
interviews with approximately forty franchisees in the automobile chan-
nel was undertaken to identify alternative influence strategies with
apparent applicability in distribution channels. Only influence stra-
tegies which can be directly utilized by boundary personnel in attempts
to apply their firm's power on a target firm's autonomous decision
making and/or behavior or on issues where the source firm might reaso-
3
nably apply its authority were considered. The guiding philosophy
behind this review was provided by Stern and Heskett (1969) when they
propose that the use of power... "may be of any degree of compulsion
from the gentlest suggestion to absolute domination."
Each strategy identified through the literature review and inter-
views '.vas classified into one of two general types of influence stra-
tegies as indicated in Figure 1. Implicit influence strategies are
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relatively indirect, non-overt strategies where the boundary person
does not directly mention his desires nor states the implications of
the target's compliance or noncompliance with his wishes. Rather,
discussions are used to hopefully direct or modify the target's
general perceptions of how he should operate his business to maximize
its goal attainment. On the other hand, explicit influence strategies
are where the boundary person directly mentions his desires and/or
states or infers the implications of the target firm's compliance or
noncompliance with his wishes. Figure 3 exhibits a breakdown of these
strategies in greater detail.
[Place Figure 3 About Here]
Implicit Influence Strategies . As indicated in Figure 3, two pri-
mary types of implicit influence strategies appear to exist. Informa-
tion exchange strategies (V3) are where the boundary person gives
generalized opinions and/or information on business issues (e.g., "A
forty-five days supply of new cars is best for most dealers") within
interfirm discussions in a straightforward manner. Aside from direct
conversations, other information sources such as computer printouts or
recommended price lists may be utilized. Information control strate-
gies (V4) which are identified and discussed by Tedeschi, e_t. al.
(1973) are similar to the information exchange strategies in that they
are relatively indirect where the intent or purpose behind the
influence attempt may not be obvious. However, in using these stra-
tegies, the boundary person withholds or possibly manipulates objec-
tive information (i.e., information filtering) in attempts to facili-
tate target compliance. Thus use of information control strategies
involves direct deception.
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Explicit Influence Strategies . Two main types of explicit influence
strategies appear to exist. Explicit
, unweighted strategies (V5) are
where the boundary person merely communicates his desires on a particu-
lar issue (e.g., a desired level of the target's new product inventories)
with no consequences of the target's compliance or noncompliance either
mentioned or implied by his verbal tone. While the target may make
inferences about likely consequences, these inferences are not based on
anything the boundary person has explicitly communicated. The "command"
strategy which Angelmar and Stern (1978) define as a statement where
the source suggests that the target perform a certain action is directly
applicable here although it appears better referred to as a "direct
request" strategy in this context.
Alternatively, the boundary person may feel more than a simple sta-
tement of his desires on an issue is necessary. Explicit
,
weighted
strategies (V6) are where he states or infers actual consequences of
compliance or noncompliance with his wishes and can be of either an
indirect or direct nature. In using indirect explicit, weighted stra-
tegies (V7), the boundary person infers consequences of compliance or
noncompliance which he himself does not control. On the other hand,
direct explicit, weighted strategies (V8) are where the boundary per-
son states he will directly perform certain actions given the nature
of the target's behavior.
Table 1 presents a breakdown of alternative indirect and direct
explicit, weighted strategies identified in the literature review. As
evident, these strategies have received the most attention in previous
research. It is also clear from Table 1 that French and Raven's (1959)
-18-
"bases of power" rationale clearly has applicability in the influence
strategy area. Each of the five bases of power are included at one
point or another in this classification.
[Place Table 1 About Here]
Other Strategic Elements . Many other factors may affect the
nature of boundary personnel influence attempts as indicated by the
"other strategic elements" components (V9 and VIO) of Figure 3. The
general delivery and mannerisms of the boundary person may have an
affect on the outcomes he achieves (Spiro, et. al. 1977). The time
pattern of multiple influence attempts (e.g., every week or every other
week) may be critical. The selection of the influencing agent (e.g.,
whether a district or regional manager) may have an important effect
based on such factors as relative status, personality, and persuasive
abilities (Spiro, et. al. 1977). The mode of communication (e.g.,
whether in person, by mail, by phone, by third party) may affect the
outcome of the influence attempt (Balderson 1958). Finally, given the
availability of each influence strategy alternative, the boundary per-
sonnel must decide when it is worthwhile to make an effort to reach an
influence objective and with which strategy (i.e., the frequency of
using each strategy) (Bonoma 1976, Cadotte and Stern 1979).
Interaction
Given culmination of the boundary person's planning surrounding
the influence attempts on the target's autonomous decision making,
actual interaction with the target will take place. The objective of
such interaction from the source firm's point of view is to obtain
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influence on the target f inn's perceptions, behavior, and/or decision
making. Within such interfirm contacts whether in person, by phone or
mail, the boundary person may utilize various combinations of the pre-
viously identified strategies on a variety of issues. For example,
within one personal contact, a boundary person might use an implicit
influence strategy in attempting to alter the targets level of local
advertising while utilizing a combination of strategies (e.g.,
explicit, unweighted and then indirect explicit, weighted) in trying
to increase his inventory levels.
Whatever the specific nature of the interaction, a large number of
variables may have an impact on the success of a firm's influence
attempts aside from its power and its boundary personnel's influence
strategies. As indicated in Figure 1, one variable which may have an
impact in this context is the corresponding level of the target's
power. It may determine, in part, the target firm's ability to with-
stand pressurized influence attempts from the source firm (Emerson
1962, Etgar 1976, Stern 1977). Examples of other variables which have
been suggested in past research as having an important affect on the
success of a source firm's influence attempts are presented in Table 2.
[Place Table 2 About Here]
Level of Influence
This dimension has been typically referred to as the weight or
strength of power in the past (e.g., Harsanyi 1962a). This is inter-
preted to represent the level (or degree) of influence or effect that
a source firm actually attains on a target's perceptions, behavior.
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and/or decision making. As indicated previously, the construct of
influence has an inherent place in the conceptual framework given
power is defined as "potential influence." If a source firm is suc-
cessful in an influence attempt with a target firm, influence will
result. Influence may take the form of actual behavior change or
merely a change in the probabilities of performing certain behaviors
(Harsanyi 1962a, Heskett, jet. al. 1971).
Types of Influence
Three primary types of influence in which actual direction in beha-
vior and/or change in the probability to act may result from interfirm
interactions as indicated in Figure 1. First, a firm's boundary per-
sonnel may affect a target's behavior by changing his general percep-
tions of what constitutes optimal decision strategies. The target may
begin the relationship with preconceived notions of proper decision
making in specific areas (e.g., new product inventory levels, number
of salespeople). Through interactions over time, these perceptions
may become more congruent with the source's positions on these issues
if implicit influence strategies are used properly with an adequate
level of power. Moreover, some changes in the targets perception can
occur without the conscious implementation of any implicit influence
strategies (as indicated by the line segment from a firm's level of
power to the interaction phase and beyond). Merely through the
existence of a dependent channel relationship, some changes in percep-
tion can result (Parsons 1963). Influence on another firm's general
decision making which is facilitated through the target's perception
change over time will be referred to as implicit influence .
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The boundary personnel of a source firm may take a more direct
route in attempts to alter the target's behavior and/or decision making.
Rather than try to change the target's general perceptions of optimal
decision making, explicit influence strategies may be utilized. Even
though the target may feel that the recommended or desired actions are
not in his best interests, he may still alter his behavior if the pres-
sure applied by the source's boundary personnel is high enough to over-
come any resistance on his part (Hunt and Nevin 1974, Lusch 1976).
Influence on another firm's general decision making or behavior which
is facilitated through use of pressure in overt attempts to change the
target's behavior and/or decision making within specific issues will
be referred to as explicit influence . Explicit influence may also be
gained without the direct use of any influence strategies. The target
may perceive that the source will use pressure in the near future if
he does not alter his behavior. If he wants to avoid such a confronta-
tion, he may react in a manner agreeable with the source's desires on
an issue or issues.
Finally, the third form of influence identified in this research is
based on the target doing favors for the source either to (1) reward
past favors or (2) build credits with the source which he can use at
some future point in time. Thus "give and take" or reciprocal motiva-
tions on one hand and conscious manueverings for the future on the
other may result in the target altering his behavior. Which actions he
actually performs will be based on his anticipation of the source's
expectations in the relationship (e.g., more local advertising is always
desired) and his beliefs concerning the source's reactions to certain
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of his behaviors (Simon 1953, Nagel 1968, Lehman 1969). As such, this
type of effect will be referred to as anticipatory influence . In
situations where the source firm's expectations on important issues
are readily discernable, no influence attempts may be required by
the source's boundary personnel in obtaining levels of anticipatory
influence (symbolized by the line from a firm's power through the
interaction phase to anticipatory influence). As suggested in
Figure 1, use of explicit, unweighted strategies where the expec-
tations of the source firm are directly translated to the target may
also contribute to the level of a source firm's anticipatory influence
in a relationship.
Note that like explicit influence, anticipatory influence involves
deviations from the target's perceptions of his optimal positions on
issues aside from taking the source firm into account. However, whereas
the former deals with behavior and/or probability of behavior change
externally motivated by the source, anticipatory influence is based on
the internal motivations of the target. For example, if a source's
boundary person asks for a personal favor or repayment of a debt with a
referent influence strategy, any alteration in the target's behavior
4
would be classified as explicit influence and not anticipatory influence.
Feedback Effects
As suggested previously and exhibited in Figure 1, the manner in
which boundary personnel influence a target firm may subsequently
feedback to affect future levels of their firm's power (Heskett, et .
al. 1971). The level of the target's dependence in the relationship
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may be affected by any costs he perceives to arise based on the source
firm's use of power over time. Tedeschi, £t. al. (1973) refer to
these as target-based costs and predict they may result from the
target's resistance to influence, his retaliation, or any counter-
influence attempts on his part. Additionally, in an interfirm context,
any profits which the target perceives his firm to lose as a result of
source firm influence need to be included here. Tedeschi, et_. al.
(1973) indicate that the route a source firm takes in its influence
attempts can dramatically affect such costs, "The source can minimize
target-based costs by the judicious choice of influence modes, because
a target probably will not retaliate in response to a persuasive com-
munication but is much more likely to respond to coercive influence
with coercive countermeasures."
Of course, it is also possible that the target may perceive his
profitability to be enhanced due to source firm influence. This may
be especially true if a large level of implicit influence is achieved
by the source in their relationship. In such cases, the targets
dependence may actually be increased based on the source firm's use
of power.
It also appears possible that the level of source firm's power may
be directly affected based on absolute and relative levels of influence
in the relationship. If the source's overall level of influence in
the channel relationship is greater than the expected level from the
target's point of view (Bucklin 1973), this may serve to hamper the
firm's potential influence in the future. Additionally, if the source
firm has attained a high level of influence on the target's behavior
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but the target perceives he has attained very little corresponding
influence on the source firm's behavior, the source's potential
influence in the future may be constrained to a degree.
OTHER DIMENSIONS OF POWER
Extension of Power
The. extension or domain of a firm's power refers to the set of
firms over which it exhibits some level of power. As suggested in
Figure 1 and in research by Beier and Stern (1969) and Etgar (1976),
any firm may exhibit some power in each of its ongoing channel rela-
tionships. This reasoning results from the fact that each commercial
channel member is directly dependent to some degree on the other insti-
tutions in the channel for accomplishing its tasks and achieving its
goals (Beier and Stern 1969, Stern 1977). Only in channel transac-
tions which involve one shot sales contracts where no business rela-
tionship exists over time would a source firm have no authority or the
target firm have no dependence in their relationship. Of course, the
level of a firm's power may vary considerably across channel dyads.
Additionally, as indicated by Stern and Reve (1980), levels of power
may vary to a large extent across alternative channel systems (e.g., a
franchise versus an administered channel system).
Scope of Power
The scope or range of a firm's power refers to the percentage
of the target's decisions which can be affected by the source firm
(Beier and Stern 1969). With a high level of source power or poten-
tial influence, every decision of the target may be influenceable to
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a degree. Contrarily, very few target decisions may be affected by
a source firm with low power. Of course, many of the other variables
discussed within the paper (e.g., the target's level of power, a boun-
dary person's persuasive abilities) may have an impact on this dimen-
sion. An especially important consideration appears to be the relative
importance of the target's decisions which the source attempts to
influence as suggested by Dahl (1957) and Lusch (1977). A high level
of target resistance may result when the source firm attempts to
influence a relatively important decision. On the other hand, the
relative importance of a target's decisions must also be evaluated
from the source firm's point of view. There may be some target deci-
sions which are so unimportant to the source that no influence
attempts occur on them.
Costs of Applying Power
The costs of applying or exerting power in a channel relationship
Is a dimension which boundary personnel must consider in developing
their influence strategy. As indicated by Harsanyi (1962a) and Bonoma
(1976), the costs of applying power may become so high on certain
issues that it makes the use of power prohibitive.
Tedeschi, et. al. (1973) also identify another type of cost (i.e.,
aside from target based costs) associated with a source firm's influence
attempts, "source based costs." They are defined as costs voluntarily
incurred by the source given he decides an influence attempt is neces-
sary. Tedeschi, e_t. al. (1973) discuss (1) communication costs (e.g.,
letters, phone calls, boundary person trip expenses), (2) surveillance
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costs associated with observing the target's reactions to influence
attempts, and (3) costs associated with carrying out threats as being
applicable source based costs. They also indicate that the time the
source spends in its influence attempts will have associated financial
costs. This may be especially critical in terms of opportunity costs
boundary personnel incur when spending time in influence attempts
rather than on other job responsibilities (Harsanyi 1962a). Addi-
tionally, within interfirm settings, financial costs associated with
any training programs designed to enhance the boundary person's ability
to interact with target firms must also be considered as well as any
supplemental materials (e.g., computer printouts, market fact sheets,
operation manuals) utilized by them in their influence attempts.
There also may be certain "unintended" costs associated with the
source firm's influence attempts. If certain influence strategies are
used in an inappropriate manner (e..g, too much pressure is applied),
they may have an adverse effect on the source firm's actual financial
performance. If the target becomes disenchanted with his business and
fails to run it diligently as a result of outside interference, his
firm's sales and financial performance can be hampered. This can
feedback to affect the size of its sales transactions with the source
firm. Additionally, if the source firm tries to maximize its short
run gains by domineering the target firm, it may affect the long run
financial stability of their relationship. High turnover among orga-
nizations within the source's distribution channel can result, further
hampering its financial performance.
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Another unintended source based cost associated with the use of
power may be a reduction in its subsequent level of power. As
discussed previously, if target based costs due to a source firm's
influence attempts are high, the target's dependence in the relation-
ship may be lessened. Moreover, a high level of current influence may
constrain the future level of power to a degree.
It also appears that another category of costs associated with a
source firm's influence attempts can be identified in an interfirm
context. "Dyad based costs" may be defined as costs which are jointly
incurred by both firms in a channel dyad as a result of interfirm
influence attempts. Costs involved in transacting everyday business
between the two firms may be affected by the use of power. "If each
party in the dyad try to get the best of the other party transaction
by transaction, a loss to both sides may occur in terms of mounting
transactional costs" (Alderson 1965). This may be due to the addi-
tional time and effort required to meet the requirements of any exchange
agreements as well as any intrachannel conflict that may arise in this
context. As Lusch (1976) suggests, the nature of the influence stra-
tegies used in a relationship (e.g., coercive versus noncoercive) can
have a direct bearing on levels of intrachannel conflict. This may be
especially true if the source's use of power is seen to impede the
target's goal attainment or autonomy (Stern and Heskett 1969). Target
attributions of the effects a source's influence strategies have on
the dyads joint performance as well as each firm's individual perfor-
mance levels may have a critical impact here.
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An important factor to consider in future research is the degree
to which the aforementioned costs vary based on the specific influence
strategy utilized. For example, an information exchange strategy may
contribute very little to any intrachannel conflicts which arise
between two firms. Because they merely involve discussions and the
presentation of information, a congenial relationship between the par-
ties may be facilitated through their usage. However, time involve-
ment, training, and supplemental material costs (e.g., use of computer
reports) may be relatively high as a result of their frequent use. On
the other hand, use of a coercive influence strategy, while relatively
less time consuming, may have a dramatic effect on transaction costs
because its use involves direct pressure on the target's autonomous
decision making.
THE POWER-CONFLICT RELATIONSHIP
Earlier, the issues raised by Etgar (1978a) and Lusch (1978) con-
cerning the relationship between the use of power and intrachannel
conflict were mentioned. Etgar (1978a) proposes that (1) the use of
power may be most frequently utilized as a response to intrachannel
conflict and (2) the use of power may be most effective in solving
high level intrachannel conflicts. Lusch (1978), on the other hand,
cites a variety of research which indicates that Etgar' s basic orien-
tation may be inappropriate. He observes, "On the basis of the pre-
ceding evidence it should be clear that Etgar' s statement that the use
of power is an end result of conflict is, at best, highly speculative
and not consistent with the literature on the conflict process."
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Lusch (1978) contends that given the dynamics of power's usage over
time, it may be a cause as well as a response to intrachannel conflict.
The model presented within this paper as well as the discussion of
costs associated with power's use over time certainly support the more
open philosophy offered by Lusch (1978). As indicated previously, a
firm may be motivated to use its power for a variety of reasons (e.g.
,
enhancing channel coordination or channel member business efficiency)
other than putting an end to intrachannel conflicts. Indeed, the pri-
mary objective of most influence attempts may be to gain an impact on
a target's perceptions, behavior, and/or decision making. In the pro-
cess, if certain pressurized strategies are utilized frequently, high
levels of conflict within the relationship may result. As suggested
by Lusch (1978), while power may be used in attempts to reduce intra-
channel conflict, in many cases, this may simply result in additional
conflict especially if pressurized influence strategies are utilized.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this paper is to extend the conceptual framework
of interfirm power relationships in a marketing channel. A general
model of the interfirm power-influence process is developed and explained
based on previously identified dimensions of interfirm power.
The origin of a firm's power is seen to be a function of (1) its
authority and (2) the target's dependence in the interfirm relationship.
The level of a firm's power may be inferred by developing measures of
these two elements. Authority may be reflected by analyzing the nature
of the sales agreement in the channel dyad. Channel norms which pro-
vide levels of authority for firm's based on their channel positions
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must also be considered. By measuring the source firm's role perfor-
mance (i.e., its perceived ability to carry out expected tasks based on
its position in the channel), an indicant of the target firm's depen-
dence in the relationship may be obtained.
Influence strategies or the means a firm's boundary personnel uti-
lize in attempts to attain influence on the target's decision making
have a primary place in the model. Based on a review of the literature,
previously identified influence strategies are classified into a number
of categories based on (1) whether they are relatively non-overt or
overt in nature (i.e., implicit versus explicit strategies), (2)
whether they specify consequences of the target's behavior (i.e.,
explicit, unweighted versus explicit, weighted), or (3) whether the
boundary personnel directly intervenes given the nature of the
target's behavior (i.e., indirect versus direct explicit, weighted
strategies). Later in the paper, possible costs associated with the
use of these strategies are discussed.
Three primary types of influence (i.e., effect on a firm's behavior
and/or decision making) are identified. Implicit influence is based on
the targets' perception change while explicit influence is based on the
source firm's boundary personnel pressuring the target into some beha-
vior or behaviors. Anticipatory influence is based on the target doing
favors for the source firm in order to build up future "credits" in
their relationship. Feedback effects between levels of influence, the
target firm's subsequent dependence and the source's level of power are
discussed.
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Throughout the paper, the wide variety of variables which appear
to have applicability in this context were discussed. Such variables
as the target's tolerance and expectations concerning autonomy and the
source firm personnel's persuasive abilities may have a considerable
impact on the source firm's success in attaining influence on the
target firm's decision making. The actual decision of the target firm
which the source firm attempts to influence must also be considered.
Based on the descriptions of power's origin and the means of
applying power, it is clear that French and Raven's (1959) "bases of
power" rationale has applicability at each dimension. As such, it is
important for researchers to clearly establish which of these dimen-
sions they are analyzing in future studies.
This paper suggests a wide variety of future research needs.
Developing new measures of interfirm power based on dependence and
authority appears extremely important considering that in the past
power has been most frequently measured as a source firm's "attributed
influence" in a relationship from the target firm's point of view as
indicated by Reve and Stern (1979). Power and influence are two
separate constructs and, as evident from the discussions herein, may
not be equal to each other in channel dyads.
More conceptual work is required in developing improved classifica-
tions of applicable influence strategies and identifying additional
types of influence within channel settings. Measures of influence
strategies and overall influence and its types must be devised. The
suggested linkages of these variables with other constructs in the
general model (e.g., power) as well as each other must be empirically
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tested. The costs associated with the use of each influence strategy
must be empirically specified.
Special attention must be given to the use of implicit influence
strategies within dyadic channel relationships in the future. In the
past, channel researchers have concentrated on explicit strategies
which are used in direct attempts to alter a target firm's behavior on
certain decisions. Implicit strategies may have a more long run impact
as they deal with an orientation of the target's thinking in the channel
relationship.
The impact of such variables as the target's tolerance for
influence or the source's persuasive abilities as well as the nature
of feedback effects in this process must be empirically evaluated.
Moreover, other behavioral constructs related to the power-influence
process (e.g., satisfaction, cooperation) must be studied. Perhaps an
integration of Robicheaux and El-Ansary's (1975) general model with the
model developed in this paper would lead to additional insights here.
Stern and Reve (1980) develop a political-economy approach to the
study of distribution channels which attempts to chart out or classify
the total field of channel interaction. They center on the internal
political economy which deals with the internal structuring and func-
tioning of the distribution channel. This paper emphasizes the inter-
nal socio-political structure and functioning of a distribution chan-
nel which Stern and Reve (1980) generally specify. Additionally, it
also distinguishes some important economic processes within the channel
(e.g., a source firm's role performance on generating consumer demand)
highly related to the nature of interfirm behavioral interactions. As
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such, this paper expands on some basic elements of the general frame-
work developed by Stern and Reve (1980). Through such efforts, the
development of a theory on power specific to marketing channels may be
facilitated.
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FOOTNOTES
Influence and control are seen as synonymous constructs in this
research.
2
It is assumed that boundary personnel are one resource of a business
firm. As such, any interpersonal power they may exhibit is seen to
contribute to the level of their firm's power.
3
As such, general communication strategies which may be used to (1)
gather from the source to utilize in subsequent strategy formulation
(i.e., a question strategy (Angelmar and Stern 1978)) or (2) build a
personal relationship to be utilized at a later point (i.e., compli-
mentary or supportive strategies) are not considered further in this
context.
4
The detinitions of the primary constructs in this study are included
in the Appendix.
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Table 1
A Classification of Explicit, Weighted Strategies
Indirect Explicit, Weighted Strategies
1. Warnings (Tedeschi, et. al. 1973, Angelmar and Stern 1978):
the source predicts harmful consequences from the environment
if the target refrains from doing an action he recommends
(e.g., "Your profits will decrease if you do not increase your
product inventories"); similar to the following strategies
identified in the literature: (a) the expert base of power
(French and Raven 1959); (b) a negative expertise strategy
(Harwell and Schmitt 1967); and (c) persuasion (Parsons 1963).
2. Recommendations (Angelmar and Stern 1978): the source predicts
favorable circumstances to occur from the environment if the
target follows his recommendations (e.g., "Your profits will
increase if you increase your product inventories"); similar
to the following strategies identified in the literature: (a)
the expert base of power (French and Raven 1959); (b) a posi-
tive expertise strategy (Harwell and Schmitt 1967); (c) menda-
tions (Tedeschi, e_t. al. 1973); and (d) persuasion (Parsons
1963).
3. A negative, normative strategy (Angelmar and Stern 1978): A
statement in which the source indicates that the target's past,
present, or future behavior was or will be in violation of
channel norms; similar to the normative appeal strategies
identified by (1) Bonoma and Rosenberg (1975) and (2) Tedeschi,
_et. al. (1973).
3. A positive, normative strategy (Angelmar and Stern 1978): A
statement in which the source indicates that the target's past,
present, or future behavior was or will be in conformity with
channel norms; similar to the normative appeal strategies
identified by (1) Bonoma and Rosenberg (1975) and (2) Tedeschi,
et. al. (1973).
Direct Explicit, Weighted Strategies
1. A coercive strategy : the source threatens the target with
punishments (e.g., less cooperation on product allocation) for
noncompliant behavior; similar to the following strategies in
the literature: (a) the coercive base of power (French and
Raven 1959); (b) deterrents (Parsons 1963); and (c) threats
(Tedeschi, et. al. 1973, Angelmar and Stern 1978).
Table 2
Examples of Other Variables Which May Affect
the Influencibility of a Target
Personal traits and characteristics of the target
1. Tolerance for influence (Bucklin 1973, Robicheaux and El-Ansary
1975)
2. Risk taking propensities (Harsanyi 1962a)
3. Assertiveness and need for dominance (Hickson, £t. al. 1971)
4. Bargaining tendencies (Stephenson, et. al. 1979)
5. Persuasive abilities (Spiro, e_t. al. 1977)
6. Rigidity and authoritarianism (Crutchfield 1955, French 1956)
7. Certainty of one's opinions (French 1956, French and Snyder
1956)
Expectations of the target
1. Concerning minimum, acceptable, and maximum levels of source
from influence (Bucklin 1973)
2. Concerning the outcomes of performing the desired action
(Tedeschi, et. al. 1973)
Decision centered variables
1. The importance of the target's decision which the source
attempts to influence (Simon 1953)
2. Degree to which the opinions, perceptions, and/or goals of
the parties differ on the decision in question (Festinger and
Thibaut 1951, French 1956, Cadotte and Stern 1979)
Variables external to the channel
1. The state of the economy (Bucklin 1973, Stern and Reve 1980)
2. Interchannel competition (Bucklin 1973, Stern and Reve 1980)
3. Legislative actions (Assael 1968, Bucklin 1973)
Table 1 (continued)
2. A reward strategy : the source promises future mediated induce-
ments (e.g., more cooperation on product allocation) for
target compliance; similar to the following strategies in the
literature: (a) the reward base of power (French and Raven
1959); (b) inducements (Parsons 1963); and (c) promises
(Tedeschi, et. al. 1973, Angelmar and Stern 1978).
3. A legitimate strategy : the source refers to normative, ethical,
or legal standards in their relationship and implies that he
will take punative actions should the target fail to comply
with his desires; similar to the following strategies identi-
fied in the literature: (a) the legitimate base of power
(French and Raven 1959); (b) activation of commitments
(Parsons 1963); and (c) a debt strategy (Harwell and Schmitt
1967).
4. A referent strategy : the source stresses their friendship or
previous favors in attempts to attain target compliance;
similar to the following strategies in the literature: (a)
the referent base of power (French and Raven 1959); and (b)
liking or debt strategies (Harwell and Schmitt 1967).
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APPENDIX
Definitions of Key Constructs
Authority : A firms prescribed right to affect certain behaviors
which is accepted by another firm.
Dependence : A firm' s need to maintain a relationship in order to
achieve its goals.
Influence : The actual effect one firm has on another firm's beha-
vior and/or decision making.
Anticipatory_InfJ.u_enc^e_2_ Source firm influence facili-
tated through target favors in the relationship.
Ex^lic^t_Inf_lu^n£ej_ Source firm influence facilitated
through its use of pressure in the relationship.
_Im£lic_it_I_nf_lue^nce_^ Source firm influence facilitated
through the target's perception change in the
relationship.
Influence Strategies : The means boundary personnel utilize in applying
their firms power in attempts to attain influence on
another firm's behavior and/or decision making.
Ex_plicJ.t_in^f]^u^nc,e_s_tr^t_eg2-e^: Direct strategies where
the boundary person mentions his desires and/or states
or infers consequences of the target's compliance or
noncompliance.
Explicit, unweighted: the boundary person merely
communicates his desires to the target.
Explicit, weighted: the boundary person states or
infers consequences of the target's compliance or
noncompliance with his wishes.
Direct explicit, weighted: the boundary person says
he will directly perform certain actions based on
the target's compliant or noncompliant behavior.
Indirect explicit, weighted: the boundary person pre-
dicts consequences of the target's behavior which
occur as a result of the environment.
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Appendix (continued)
^m^licit:_i_nf_luen£e_s_trat^g_iej^: Indirect strategies
where the boundary personnel use discussions in hopes
of motivating the target's perception change on
certain issues.
Information control: the boundary person withholds or
possibly manipulates objective information in
attempts to facilitate target compliance.
Information exchange: the boundary person gives
generalized opinions and/or information on business
issues within interfirm discussions in a straight-
forward manner.
Power : A firm's ability to influence the perceptions, behavior,
and/or decision making of another firm (i.e., potential
influence)
.
Role Performance : A firm's actual ability to carry out expected tasks
and responsibilities based on its position in the chan-
nel as perceived by members of another firm.
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